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Heidegger’s Notion of Religion: the limits of being-understanding
The engagement with Heidegger’s interpretation of primal Christianity1 is not a new topic of
debate and there have been various excellent commentaries on this topic. The aim of this
paper will not be to repeat or dispute these previous discussions, but rather, to posit
Heidegger’s relationship with the question of religion in a new light. The aim of this paper is
to disclose how religion is conceived in Heidegger’s path of thinking, and further, how the
phenomenon of religion poses problems for Heidegger’s path of thinking.
In the most general sense, this article will provide three arguments: the first that
Heidegger in his early lectures on ‘primal Christianity’ delimits the notion of religion to an
experience of the truth of being. Additionally, I will argue that in providing this interpretation
of the notion of religion Heidegger will also find himself inevitably denying any authenticity
to traditional religions and accordingly, inevitably looking for an alternative to traditional
religion. Finally, I will argue that the phenomenon of religion itself reveals a fundamental
distinction between ‘being’ and the ‘ground of being’ (or the otherwise than being). This
explains the sub-title of the article insofar as I am arguing that a proper phenomenology of
religion (in Heidegger’s sense of phenomenology; as ontology) discloses a major flaw in
Heidegger’s prioritisation of Dasein as the entity who understands.
In attempting this task, I will provide two interpretations of Heidegger’s thinking in
relation to religion. The first will be an interpretation of Heidegger’s early lectures on
religion, published under the title of The Phenomenology of Religious Life. This will allow
me to ascertain the implications of his interpretation of primal Christianity within the realm
of the philosophical problem of grounding and also the preconception of religion founded
1

Martin Heidegger himself coins the term ‘primal’ or ‘primordial’ Christianity in his 1920-1 lectures entitled
‘Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion’ in which he states: “Primordial Christian religiosity is in
Primordial Christian life experience and is itself such.” (Martin Heidegger, 2004, p.55). This phrase is
translated by Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren as ‘primal Christianity’ in Reading Heidegger From the
Start: Essays in his earliest thought (Kisiel & van Buren, 1994)

therein. I will argue, on this basis, that Heidegger’s interpretation of primal Christianity
generates a conception of religion as merely ontical, which then serves as the basis for
Heidegger’s later relation with religion.
The second interpretation of Heidegger’s relation with religion, then, will focus on his
later engagement with pre-metaphysical Greek thinking and German poetry. In this part of
the paper I will provide a detailed exposition of how Heidegger relates to religious concepts
and phenomena in his lectures on Parmenides (Heidegger, 1992), Heraclitus (Heidegger,
1993), and then Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister” (Heidegger, 1996). I will argue on this basis
that Heidegger conceives religion in these texts as an intrinsically ‘inauthentic’ phenomenon
for which he will then seek a replacement. The questions this paper will ask of Heidegger’s
thinking will be: how does religion pose problems for this path of thinking, how does the
phenomenon of religion resist Heidegger’s interpretation, and thus, is there potential for
religion to delimit the validity of the quest for the being of Dasein?

§1. Key Concepts:
The arguments that this paper provides operate on the basis of my use of two key concepts:
‘religion’ and ‘authenticity’. The former, I am arguing, poses a problem for Heidegger’s path
of thinking; the latter, I would claim, is pivotal to Heidegger’s conception and then dismissal
of any possible genuine place of religion in the being of Dasein.
For the purposes of this paper I am using the term ‘religion’ to mean “the
phenomenon of religion”. In other words, I am claiming that religion is a phenomenon in
precisely the way that Heidegger defines phenomenon in Being and Time: “the showingitself-in-itself of the being of entities” (Heidegger, 1962, p.60). Any phenomenon, it follows,
either is the being of the entity or ‘belongs-to’ to an entity in its being. On this basis, my use
of the concept religion in this paper will signify ‘religion’ as a phenomenon that belongs-to

and discloses the being of humans. I would argue that insofar as we conceive of religion as a
phenomenon the meaning of religion is located in and grounded upon the capacity of humans
(in our being) to be directed towards and have a relationship with that through which we
uncover meaning and purpose for our living2. The question that the phenomenon of religion
poses of Heidegger’s philosophy is this: If the concept of Dasein cannot adequately serve as
the ground for the phenomenon of religion, then can we say that Dasein really (genuinely)
signifies the being of humans?
The concept ‘authenticity’ or ‘Eigentlichkeit’ is a somewhat contested term in
Heideggerian scholarship. Benjamin Crowe, in his work on Heidegger’s Religious Origins
notes that there are three main interpretative trends in relation to the term: the first which he
calls an ontological account, the second he calls the ‘narrativist’ reading, and the third, which
he calls the ‘emancipatory’ reading (Crowe, 2006, pp164, 167-169). According to Crowe, the
first interpretative trend emphasises the ontological character of the term as reflecting and
fitting into Heidegger’s philosophical project as a whole (Crowe, 2006). The narrative
account emphasises the connection between the concept of authenticity and ‘how’ we live
and emphasises how the concept fits into Heidegger’s general account of selfhood (Crowe,
2006). The third and final account is one which views Heidegger as anticipating to some
extent philosophers such as Derrida and Levinas; therein emphasising the ‘personal’
character of life (Crowe, 2006).
The approach I will take in this paper is the first; the ontological reading exemplified
by those like Thomas Sheehan who constitutes authenticity as intrinsically connected with an
encounter with one’s own proper or true being: “one recuperates one's essence and thus
attains ‘authenticity’ by becoming one's proper (or ‘authentic’) self” (Sheehan, 1998).
Authenticity, I would argue, is a concept that harks back to and is grounded upon Aristotle’s
2

This argument was the substance of my PhD thesis, now published as a book (Brook, 2009) and also a number
of conference papers

concept of φρονησις in the Nicomachean Ethics, especially as Heidegger interprets it to refer
to the being of “something which can also be otherwise” than itself (Heidegger, 1997, pp.345). Following this quote, Heidegger goes on to claim that “it is not at all a matter of course
that Dasein be disclosed to itself in its proper being” - its true being (Heidegger, 1997). This
discussion is crucial to understanding the later development of the concept of authenticity as
the encounter of one’s own being or the truth of being-human.

§2. Commentaries on Heidegger’s Interpretation of Primal Christianity
As mentioned previously, there have been many excellent commentaries of Heidegger’s
interpretation of primal Christianity. I will set the context for my interpretation of
Heidegger’s lectures and writings on religion through a general and brief discussion of some
of the pivotal themes in these commentaries. I will broadly touch upon three themes of
relevance: what Heidegger finds in primal Christianity, how this serves as a ground for
phenomenology, and the implications of Heidegger’s interpretation for his later engagements
with religion or religious themes.

A. The What:
There is a general consensus that Heidegger found (if not sought from the outset) in Primal
Christianity the ground for a philosophical notion of ‘authenticity’ (Capelle, 1997). This
notion of authenticity does not refer to the personal; ethical, spiritual or psychological, but
rather is called ‘factical’ – referring to the ontological (Caputo, 1993). Authenticity, as such,
refers to some sense of authentic-being; a being-truly, or properly human. In this case,
authenticity pertains to an authentic experience of what it is to be human, and further, the
ground for a genuine understanding – a philosophy proper Capelle, 1997; van Buren, 1994).
The former discloses via primal Christianity the content of an experience of life as authentic

(being) in a certain kind of temporality (van Buren, 1994; Sheehan, 1986) and a certain how
of interpreting life in relation to meaning (Sheehan, 1986; Capelle, 2005).

The latter

discloses the test or framework for an authentic understanding that is also a phenomenology
as ontology (Sheehan, 1986; Capelle, 2005). What Heidegger finds in Primal Christianity, is a
double point of origin for phenomenology: the ontological content of human existence and
the ground of a genuine way of living philosophically.

Primal Christian Experience and the Ground of a Genuine Philosophical Life:
The ground of a philosophical life is intrinsically connected to the disclosure in advance of
authentic factical experience in a certain way, i.e., the authentic facticity of understanding.
Primal Christian experience is the context for this disclosure of an authentic factical
understanding and therein allows of the disclosure in advance of a genuine understanding
which in turn serves as the ground of a genuine philosophical life (van Buren, 1994).
Insofar as the disclosure of authenticity is equally (in this sense) the disclosure of
being, the exposition of authenticity in primal Christianity also grounds phenomenology. The
disclosure of an authentic sense of temporality in primal Christianity, then, is the disclosure
of the temporality of being-Dasein (Capelle, 2005). Moreover, this disclosure of temporality
forms the basis of Dasein’s intrinsic quest for being – to understand (van Buren, 1994).
Heidegger’s interpretation also served as a ‘how’ of overcoming metaphysics (as
onto-theology); as a ground for a non-metaphysical way of questioning being (Sadler, 1996).
In part, this destruction of metaphysics operated as a kind of philosophical theology, a
philosophical Lutheran (Protestant) critique of the theological dimension of Aristotle’s
metaphysics (Sadler, 1996). However, the primary aim was ontological, or an ontological
revolution, which also at the same time leads to the discreditation of theology as a
philosophical endeavour altogether (van Buren, 1994). The genuine philosophical life, in its

ground disclosed via primal Christianity, forms the horizon for the question of Dasein as the
primary question of philosophy – genuine only as ontology.

Implications of the Interpretation of Primal Christianity:
The implications of Heidegger’s interpretation of primal Christianity for his thinking (in
relation to theology and religion) are closely tied to the notion of the ‘turn’ (Kehre) (Kovacs,
1990).3 Insofar as primal Christianity served as a horizon for the question of grounding
philosophy there is a great deal of ambiguity as to how this interpretation formed or
influenced Heidegger’s later thinking about religion. One of the consistent themes herein is
the view that in the ‘turn’ Heidegger moved towards early Greek thinking (via Nietzsche) as
a horizon for the proper discussion of religion in a non-metaphysical sense (Caputo, 1993). In
this respect, early Greek thinking is viewed as the space in which Heidegger founded a rival
(to Christian) sense of the holy (Caputo, 1993). This is paralleled in Heidegger’s
investigations into Hölderlin, perhaps in the sense of a German history of being in relation to
the divine (van Buren, 1994).
There are, then, two general themes in the commentaries pertinent to the implications
of primal Christianity for Heidegger’s later thinking about religion. The first is that the
‘demythologising’ or ‘ontologising’ of primal Christianity leads to a thinking that subsumes
the divine under the truth of being (Caputo, 1993). The second theme is that Heidegger’s
search for ground (in primal Christianity) operates within a prioritisation of the question of
being in such a way that ontology becomes a religion of sorts (Kovacs, 1990; Sadler, 1996).

3

The notion of the Kehre in Heidegger’s philosophy is a contested term. However, for the purposes of this paper
the notion of Kehre is used solely insofar as it helps us place in context the changing relation Heidegger had
with religion and religious phenomena.

§3. Heidegger on Primal Christianity
In turning to Heidegger’s interpretation of what he calls primal Christianity, through the
translations of his lectures on religion, my aim is to draw out the implicit conception of
religion that is developed therein. As such, the task is not so much to identify the ‘what’ or
‘how’ of Heidegger’s approach to primal Christianity, but rather, to disclose the
preconception of religion within his path of thinking.

Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion
When Heidegger attempts to address primal Christianity his primary agenda is the disclosure
of factical existence in the sense of ‘how’ humans may experience and understand our own
being ‘authentically’. In this respect Heidegger’s interpretation of primal Christianity appears
to achieve two interrelated endpoints: the positing of a certain religious experience of life as
an authentic experience of being-human in the historical and ‘Chairological’ temporality, and
further, the ‘demythologising’ of primal Christian experience. This accords with Heidegger’s
stated task of the explication of concrete religious phenomena and the penetration of the
ground (being) of these phenomena (Heidegger, 2004).
However, these results are played out within a second goal of the lectures, namely: the
explication of fundamental religious experience and the quest to understand this experience in
connection to all religious phenomena (Heidegger, 2004). Heidegger, then, cannot be seen to
merely demythologise religious experience, but also, actively seek a sense of the meaning of
religion in an ontological sense.4 The question (of this paper) therefore becomes: how does
Heidegger conceive the meaning of religion, and further, what are the essential characteristics
given therein?

4

Universal: “all religious phenomena”, Ontological: “original” – grounding phenomena.

The conception of religion is initially driven by the matter of Heidegger’s thinking in
a more general sense, e.g., the horizon of the ontological question of how beings are
grasped/presented in their being. As such, the question of religion operates within the context
of phenomenology-ontology in such a way that primal Christian experience discloses
something about the character of the being of Dasein (the entity who presents) and this in turn
discloses something about the essence of the meaning of religion. In the first instance, primal
Christian experience discloses the being of Dasein as factical and thus historical (Heidegger,
2004, pp.22, 86-88, 97). Accordingly, the initial turn preconceives religion as a life
experience that is factical (grounded in the being of Dasein) and historical (as a way of living
temporality) (Heidegger, 2004). Thus, in the first instance, religion is conceived by
Heidegger as a kind of authentic factical experience grounded in being Dasein.
The key to Heidegger’s interpretation of the meaning of religion lies in the question of
‘authenticity’, and moreover, the way Heidegger preconceives religious authenticity: the
potential authenticity of a human relation with God and an authentic understanding of God.
The potential authenticity of the human relation to God, as Heidegger characterises it,
pertains to the potential ‘authenticity’ of being Dasein. That is, the authenticity of religious
phenomena is grounded upon an awareness or experience of what it is to be truly human (as
Dasein) (Heidegger, 2004). As such, the first way of characterising the potential authenticity
of religion is its meaning as a life that is authentically grounded in the being of Dasein. Of
course, primal Christianity merely lives this authenticity and does not necessarily grasp
(understand properly) the ground of itself. However, the primary character of the authenticity
of religious phenomena is its belonging to the being of Dasein, i.e. the meaning of religious
phenomena is its belonging to being Dasein.
As a phenomenon, then, religion is implicitly preconceived as the relation of being
Dasein with God that may be characterised as authentic only insofar as it is grounded in what

it is to be truly human. In this respect, the authenticity of primal Christianity is the way in
which God is present in factical life as a ‘having become’ for humans in our being
(Heidegger, 2004). Further, this authenticity belongs to the being of Dasein as enactment (a
lived temporality) in which the sense of being of God is determined (Heidegger, 2004).

Augustine and Neo-Platonism
The second way Heidegger characterises the authenticity of religion focuses on the
phenomenon of understanding God. Herein, Heidegger’s lecture on St. Augustine’s
Confessions (Book 10) interprets the text within the context of the combination of theology
and philosophy as a factical life (Heidegger, 2004a). The point of origin for this analysis is
the distantiation of theology from philosophy (Heidegger, 2004a).5 Theology, as such, is
constituted via a relation of belief; the ontical science of belief as a historical phenomena
(Heidegger, 1998). Philosophy, however, is the relation of humans to being-Dasein within the
realm of comprehension (understanding).
The philosophical analysis of the meaning of religion centres on the possibility of an
authentic human understanding of the ‘towards which’ of religion. For Heidegger, in the
lectures on Augustine, this is God, gods, or the divine. The interpretation of the Confessions,
insofar as it pertains to the essence of religion, focuses on the proper human understanding of
God: what do I love when I love you? (Heidegger, 2004a) Herein, Heidegger interprets
Augustine as understanding God as ‘the Truth’, and thus, the search for God the search for
truth (Heidegger, 2004a).6

Therefore, the meaning of religion is a lived authenticity

(grounded in Dasein’s being) in the truth; the truth of being human and an authentic relation
to the truth as a being (Heidegger, 2004a).

5

Heidegger quotes Kierkegaard from Sickness Unto Death: “To comprehend is the range of man’s relation to
the human, but to believe is man’s relation to the divine.”
6
Heidegger is defining truth as ‘the truth of being’

The notion of religion within Heidegger’s interpretation of Primal Christianity:
Within Heidegger’s interpretation of primal Christianity the notion of religion is
preconceived or presupposed in two primary ways. In the first instance, religion is
preconceived as ‘religious phenomena’; a factical experience (faith/believing) that is
grounded in the being of Dasein. This ‘preconceiving’ of religion is brought about through
the phenomenological method wherein, for Heidegger, all human phenomena will be
explicated with regard to the basic characteristics of being-Dasein. The search for
philosophical ground, as such, transforms human experiences into indicative phenomena of
what it is to be Dasein. The notion of religion, therefore, is ‘preconceived’ within the context
of this transformation as necessarily a phenomena grounded upon being-Dasein. Thus, the
preconception of religion is that it signifies a factical experience of what it is to be trulyhuman, and its authenticity belongs to being-Dasein (Heidegger, 2004a).
Religion is presupposed as ‘factical experience’ within the context of Heidegger’s
phenomenological interpretation insofar as it is granted, in some sense, the character
‘authenticity’. Herein, the notion of ‘authenticity’ in Heidegger’s thinking implicitly signifies
‘truth’, ‘truth of being’, or ‘true-being’. As such, primal Christianity is granted the character
of ‘authenticity’ within the context of its factical experience of God as the truth that comes to
presence as a being: a ‘fore-giving’ of truth as a phenomenon (Heidegger, 2004a). Thus, the
‘authenticity’ of primal Christianity implicitly belongs to the experiencing of truth and the
meaning of religion therein presupposed as an ‘authentic’ factical experience of ‘the Truth’.
It can be seen that Heidegger’s turn to the essential meaning of religion as these two
interrelated ‘factical experiences’ of truth already encapsulates a ‘turn’ in Heidegger’s later
thinking, for a turn to what is traditionally called religion is no more than the path to thinking
about ‘the truth’. Equally, Heidegger’s formulation of the meaning of religion transforms

primal Christianity as a religious life into an example of an authentic existence insofar as the
notion ‘authenticity’ intrinsically belongs with the notion of ‘truth’ in factical experience.

§4. Heidegger on Early Greek Thinking and German Poetry.
In providing an overview of Heidegger’s thinking in relation to what is traditionally called
religion, or the realm of religion, my primary aim is to show how Heidegger constitutes
religion as the factical experience of the truth of being (or simply the truth). Further, I aim to
show that Heidegger sought to overcome religion (in its traditional form) by appropriating its
ground and founding, therein, an authentic philosophical-ontological eschatology and an
alternative ‘truly authentic’ factical experience of truth in poetry. Two primary themes will
serve as a point of orientation for this overview: a) the meaning of religion is the factical
experience of the truth and an encountering of the truth as a being but is not an understanding
of the truth, and b) religion is a secondary phenomena to philosophy and the possibility of a
genuine philosophical understanding of truth.

Heidegger on Early Greek Thinking:
In Heidegger’s Parmenides the interpretation of the meaning of religion appears to be a quite
straightforward continuation of his characterisation of primal Christianity. A surface read of
the text seems to indicate that the meaning of religion is the human encounter with the truth
brought to presence as divinities. The text begins with Parmenides encounter with the
goddess, Heidegger providing an argument that the goddess is the truth (Aletheia) – the truth
experienced as a person (Heidegger, 1998a). Towards the end of the text Heidegger returns
to the seemingly ‘religious’, via a discussion of the ‘how’ of Greek-Dasein’s encountering the
truth (of the emergence of being) as the divine or daemonic (Heidegger, 1998a). This ‘how’
is then discussed in relation to the being of Greek-Dasein; that Greek-Dasein presents the

divine in the encounter with the truth as it emerges into presence (Heidegger, 1998a). As
such, it appears that Heidegger intrinsically formulates religion to be the human encounter
with the truth emerging as a being. However, I would argue that in this text Heidegger seeks
the ground of what gets called religion, or religious phenomena, and negates religion in the
process.
In interpreting the fragments of Parmenides’ proem Heidegger’s primary concern is
not the human encounter of the truth as an experienced phenomenon, nor as a potentially
religious phenomenon. Rather, the question is that of Greek-Dasein’s relation with the truth
in an ontological sense insofar as it discloses something about the essential character of
Dasein as understanding, i.e. how Dasein understands being, and how the truth is essentially
an emergence of beings and being for Dasein. Equally, the question is that of Greek-Dasein
as a historical phenomenon; a phenomenon within the horizon of a Greek history of Being
and the ‘authenticity’ contained therein that discloses the truth as emergence.
The text of Heidegger’s lecture on Parmenides, then, focuses on the disclosure of the
horizon of Dasein’s being as a relation with being-itself (the truth as emergence) called the
‘uncanny’ wherein the truth itself emerges into the realm of the ordinary (Heidegger, 1998a).
The uncanny signifies ‘how’ in an ontological sense the truth is possible and therein discloses
an ‘authentic’ encounter with truth. Further, that which is encountered (the truth as emergent
as a being for Dasein) is named ‘divine’ only within the horizon of being for Greek-Dasein
and the history of being belonging to Greek-Dasein. As such, the authenticity of the divine
for Greek-Dasein is not fundamentally religious (in Heidegger’s interpretation), but rather,
the naming of the presence of present being: the emergence of being-itself for Greek-Dasein
Heidegger, 1998a).
This stance is reiterated in Heidegger’s and Fink’s lectures on Heraclitus. Again,
Heidegger argues that for Greek-Dasein, the gods belong to what is (being), and further, that

the notion Theos signifies being-itself (Heidegger & Fink, 1993). As such, humanity is a
condition for the existence of the divine insofar as it is Dasein (in our being) that presents the
divine in the understanding of being and as the being that understands (Heidegger & Fink,
1993). The divine for Greek-Dasein, Heidegger asserts, is therefore not a religious notion, nor
pertinent to religion, but is rather the naming of the presence of the truth of being as it is
understood (Heidegger & Fink, 1993). The locus of the Greek sense of the divine within the
realm of understanding is thus a purely philosophical notion that is essentially a naming of
truth in itself as it emerges into and for Dasein.
The interpretation of early Greek thinking is marked by an appropriation of the
ground of the religious by philosophy, and a philosophical overcoming of religious
phenomena through the disclosure of what Heidegger believes to be the ontological structures
of this ground. Herein, the overcoming is related to both the ground as a history of being (the
tradition of theology as grounded in Greek metaphysics) and the ground of religion as an
experiencing of truth.
Heidegger’s interpretation of early Greek thinking also serves as a third ground,
namely: the foundation of an authentic philosophical-ontological eschatology of truth. This is
expressed poignantly in the lectures on Parmenides wherein Heidegger attributes ‘a-theism’
to the absence of the divine which is also the horizon of the modern forgetting/withdrawal of
being (Heidegger, 1998a). Philosophy, as a genuine factical life in the modern history of
being, then takes up the task of destiny that brings being into presence: thinking that seeks the
truth as the essence of emergence and thus brings ‘occidental humanity’ to the home region
of the goddess aletheia (Heidegger, 1998a). Philosophy, for Heidegger, thus replaces religion
with an ontological eschatology. This is only possible insofar as religion comes to be
constituted as a phenomenon of inauthenticity (the fallen-ness of Dasein’s being) that serves
as the everyday ground of a-theism (the withdrawal of being). Insofar as religion can no

longer be constituted as an authentic encounter with the truth (as being) Heidegger will then
seek to find an alternative ‘authentic’ encounter of the emergence of truth, namely: poetry.

German Poetry (Hölderlin) as the ‘authentic’ alternative factical life.
For Heidegger, the overcoming of religion is not simply a matter of the substitution of
theology by the ontological, but is also the disclosure of an alternative more ‘authentic’ realm
of Dasein’s encounter with the emergence of truth in factical experience. Herein, Heidegger
supplants the need for religion in a traditional sense while considering the destiny of being
for ‘German humanity’ via Hölderlin’s hymn ‘The Ister’ (Heidegger, 1997). The overcoming
of religion produced here is disclosed not only as seeking a more ‘authentic’ factical
experience, but moreover, a necessary denial of any ‘authenticity’ (primacy) of religious
phenomena within Heidegger’s path of thinking.
The replacement of religion by poetry outlined in this text takes place implicitly
within a reversal or negation of primal Christian experience wherein the Christian notion of
sin and salvation are posited as an inauthentic negation (Heidegger, 1997). Accordingly, the
primordial Greek and German humanity (in their relation of the foreign) together through
their poets are called back to their essence: the homeliness of Dasein by the river – the
dwelling and building place to which Dasein authentically (in our being) belongs (Heidegger,
1997). Herein, the proper home of Dasein is with the holy: nature and the divinity presenced
within the relation of Dasein and the power of nature (mother Germania) (Heidegger, 1997).
Heidegger can be seen to make two essential moves in this lecture on Hölderlin: the
first to position the poet (as demigod) that replaces religious revelation, the second to
pronounce through Greek and German poetry an eschatology of being as a becoming homely
(Heidegger, 1997). This authenticity of the destiny of German Dasein, in becoming homely,

is to become homely as one’s-self: to be grounded in Dasein’s essence, a being open to being
in general as emergence, and thus, Germania – mother earth (Heidegger, 1997).

§5. The Three Primary Themes of Heidegger’s Relation with Religion:
In summary, there are three themes to be drawn out of Heidegger’s relation with religion: a)
the phases of the relation, b) the necessity of overcoming religion, and c) the notion of
authenticity in Heidegger’s thinking.

Phases of Heidegger’s relation with religion
In the first phase of Heidegger’s relation with religion, with respect to primal Christianity, he
determines the essential meaning of religion to be the ‘factical’ experience of the truth of
being in living. Herein, the phenomena of religion indicates a doubled experience of truth: the
truth of the being of Dasein experienced in life, and the truth itself emerging (encountered) as
a being. Primal Christianity, and thus religion, in this sense is essentially experiential and
does not primarily refer to understanding. Rather, the essence of religion is a notunderstanding – a faith that is grounded in Dasein’s being without any necessary intrinsic
connection to truth. Insofar as authenticity is a belonging to the truth of Dasein’s being or
truth in general the potential authenticity of religious phenomena is historical and ontical, not
ontological. Philosophical understanding, however, is essentially this seeking truth with
regard to ground – to the emergence of truth - and as such, gains priority over religion by
finding the ground of religious phenomena. Moreover, the essence of religion is a
contingency: a ‘happening’ to experience the truth without any true understanding of the
essence of truth. This is why Heidegger’s relation to religion, in the first instance, leads to an
overcoming of traditional religion.

The second phase then follows in Heidegger’s interpretations of early Greek thinking
wherein he seeks an authentic understanding of, or way of access to, the truth. This authentic
philosophical-ontological understanding thus supersedes religion by disclosing the ground of
religion (the ground of Dasein’s encounter with truth). The ‘contingency’ of religious
phenomena, that may happen upon truth and equally miss the truth, then discloses the essence
of religion to be a secondary or derivative phenomenon. Religion, as such, is grounded in
Dasein’s being that seeks the truth, but is not an intrinsically authentic phenomenon.
The third phase, then, arises in Heidegger’s attempt to find an alternative to religion,
in poetry, providing an ontological eschatology of the emergence of truth as a poetic
experience. Heidegger characterises Christianity, and by implication the phenomenon of
religion in general, as an intrinsically inauthentic encounter with the truth. The inauthenticity
of religion is disclosed precisely in its lack of intrinsic connection to the truth of Dasein’s
being and further, truth itself.

The Necessity of Overcoming Religion
To understand the necessity of overcoming religion, in Heidegger’s path of thinking, we must
first come to terms with two dimensions of Heidegger’s preconception of religion: a) religion
as theological and b) religion as experiential.
Heidegger’s preconception of religion as essentially experiential (ontical) is founded
in his relation to theology and his formulation of phenomenology as ontological. Heidegger
had two primary understandings of theology: via metaphysics and as an ontical science.
Heidegger initially related to Theology in metaphysics as an abstraction of the everyday
understanding of being and the inauthentic presupposition of metaphysical thought
(Heidegger, 1997). Theology, as such, is intrinsically connected to the inauthenticity of
metaphysics in its presupposing an entity as the ‘ousiological’ ground of presence. Further,

the proper formulation of theology is therefore non-philosophical; theology is a science of
faith as a historical/factical phenomenon (Heidegger, 1997).
In this second relation to theology, then, there are at least two preconceptions about
religion. First, that religion is properly addressed by theology (as a science) determines
religion as a merely historical phenomenon. Moreover, the essence of religion as a historical
phenomenon is ‘faith’ – a believing (understanding of believing) mode of existing towards a
historical revelation (occurrence) (Heidegger, 1997). Faith, then, is not intrinsically
‘authentic’, nor the ‘towards-which’ of faith necessarily pertinent to the essential/truth. Thus,
a foundation for Heidegger’s rejection of religion is his relation with theology, or
‘Christianity’ as a historical phenomenon.
Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology plays a pivotal role in his preconception
of religion as a historical/experiential affair. Here, I would argue, Heidegger’s formulation of
phenomenology repeats the prejudice contained within the history of philosophy, that the
primary sense of being human is understanding. There is no doubt, whatever controversy
surrounds the matter of Heidegger’s thinking or the meaning of Dasein (as a term), that the
prioritisation of Dasein’s being in Being and Time signifies the prioritisation of being human
as

understanding

(Heidegger,

1962;

Heidegger,

1996a).7

As

such,

Heidegger’s

phenomenology does not aim to explicate the being of humans in general (a philosophical
anthropology as he calls it), but is rather a fundamental ontology – disclosing the essential
ontological structures of Dasein’s being (being-understanding) (Heidegger, 1996a). Thus,
there is a certain irony in Heidegger’s relation to religion insofar as it is grounded in a
prioritisation of Dasein’s being: leading to a denial of the authenticity of religion as nonessential for Dasein (not within the realm of understanding), but also an understanding of the
7

The John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson translation is: “Dasein is in such a way as to be something which
understands something like Being… temporality as the being of Dasein, which understands being.”
Stambaugh’s Translation reads: “Da-sein is in such a way that, by being, it understands something like being.”
The locus of the term ‘Dasein’ as such is undoubtedly related to the traditional philosophical preconception of
being human as being-rational.

meaning of religion subsumed within Dasein. Religion, then, cannot be authentic because it
does not intrinsically pertain to Dasein’s being-understanding, and further, loses any
ontological significance when it is preconceived as an experience of truth grounded in
Dasein’s being.
This is precisely, in my view, why Heidegger constitutes religion as a phenomenon of
factical experience, for it doesn’t belong intrinsically to Dasein’s being. Further, the
approaches to religion born out of theology all tend to be ‘ontical’ scientific and historical –
providing Heidegger with a convenient point of origin for the consideration of religion
subsumed under Dasein’s being in an everyday sense. Heidegger’s prioritisation of Dasein’s
being, therefore, explains the necessity of overcoming religion insofar as this prioritisation
led to an ignorance/ignoring of any aspect of being human that does not pertain to the region
of understanding. The ignored regions, then, are turned into experiences grounded in
Dasein’s being.

The Notion of Authenticity in Heidegger’s path of thinking:
The problem of authenticity also revolves around Heidegger’s prioritisation of Dasein, for the
notion of authenticity therein can only signify the truth of being; what something really is or
the truth itself (as an identity). In this way, Heidegger’s thinking is forced (through the
internal logical consistency of his thinking) to seek a replacement for religion not only
because religion is preconceived as other to understanding, but also insofar as religious
notions of authenticity (especially that of Christianity) tend to be diametrically opposed to
Heidegger’s notion of authenticity as truly being Dasein. Heidegger’s later move to poetry
and art, as such, can be seen to operate in this necessity to replace religion with factical
experiences more comfortable with the authenticity of Dasein’s being-understanding.

However, it is precisely in the opposition to Heidegger’s notion of authenticity that religion
begins to say something about Heidegger’s path of thinking.

5. Concluding Questions:
I would like to conclude with a reflection upon Heidegger’s relation to religion in such a way
that religion poses some questions for Heidegger’s thinking. There are, then, three primary
questions I think religion poses to Heidegger’s path of thinking, namely: the question of
religion as a phenomenon of being-human, the question of authenticity and the question of
truth. Operating within all of these questions is the question of the limit of Heidegger’s
thinking in its fundamental character, namely: the question of the delimitations of the
prioritisation of Dasein.

The Question of the meaning of religion?
George Kovacs remarks, in his critical reflection of Heidegger’s relation to the question of
God, that Heidegger never asked ‘how’ religion belongs to human existence, nor its meaning
as a relation to the ‘other’ (Kovacs, 1990). I would posit this critical remark in a much
stronger sense: that Heidegger’s prioritisation of Dasein leads to blindness towards the
question of being-human in general that is the ground of religious phenomena. Heidegger
assumes, herein, that religion is a phenomenon grounded in Dasein’s being and as such,
cannot see the question posed by religion as a phenomenon, namely: how are humans in our
being able to be religious? Religion, herein, poses an ontological question to which
Heidegger’s thinking has no point of entry.

The Question of Dasein’s Authenticity?
The phenomenon of religion also poses two challenges to Heidegger’s notion of authenticity
as being-truly-human or being-properly-one’s-self. These challenges are posed even within
Heidegger’s interpretative relation with religion and are marked by strained and forced
interpretations of religious thought. An example of the first (religious authenticity) can be
found in Heidegger’s interpretation of Paul, and the latter (religious/ethical authenticity) in
the interpretation of Aristotle.
In relation to Paul’s letter to the Romans, we find Heidegger providing an incredibly
strained account wherein the authenticity disclosed by Paul is implicitly interpreted to signify
‘being-Dasein’ (Heidegger, 2004, p.88). This reading goes against both the general gist of the
text: that humans tend towards sin (as an ontological argument we could say: the tendency
towards sin signifies that being-human is to be-sin-full), and the following argument in this
particular text: the ground of this authenticity is not human (not I) but God.8 In this respect,
then, primal Christianity as an expression of the phenomenon of religion resists and opposes
Heidegger’s notion of authenticity.
Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, serves as the basis for
his rejection of the validity of theology as a valid part of philosophy (Heidegger, 1997, §2425, 32). Juxtaposed to Heidegger’s emphasis on the ontological dimensions of Dasein in the
ethics is Aristotle’s statement: “But such a life (Sophia) would be too high for man; for it is
not insofar as he is man that he will live so, but insofar as something divine is present in
him.”(1177b26-27) The authenticity under discussion, here, is only ontological in the sense of
ethos: of the ground of good and the being of humans in relation to this ground. As such,
Aristotle (contra Heidegger) provides an argument which characterises the being of humans
as not-being-good (“it is not insofar as he is man”) and the ground of good ‘Theos’ (“insofar
8

Romans, 8: Heidegger interprets the first half of this chapter, but avoids the second half which constitutes
authenticity as the death of the ‘sinful nature’ and God living in us.

as something divine is present in him”). Thus, in the second instance, the religious sense of
authenticity poses an ontological question that cannot be answered in Heidegger’s path of
thinking, namely: what is the ground, in an ontological sense, of the question of good, and
further, the question of why are we alive?
This then brings us to the fundamental question brought to bear against the path of
Heidegger’s thinking disclosed via religion in relation to the notion of authenticity, namely:
the question of the arche. I would argue that the dimension of metaphysics called Theology
does not pertain solely, or even primarily, to the notion of highest being or beings as a whole
(as Heidegger suggests), but rather refers to the Greek ‘religious’ question of the arche – the
original/originary ground. This question can be explicated further via the question of truth.

The Question of Truth.
Heidegger’s reading of pre-Socratic thinking serves as the basis of his key expositions on the
truth as aletheia and Theos as the truth of being emerging into presence through Dasein. Yet,
ironically, from the religious problematic, pre-Socratic thinking may also be read as the
denial of the priority of being and the prioritisation of the question of arche (originary
ground). The fragments of Parmenides proem serve as a point of orientation for this
question.9 Herein, Parmenides’ encounter with the goddess ‘truth’ (and Heidegger’s much
celebrated goddess ‘aletheia’) provides a divine revelation of two paths of truth. The first
way of truth is being: “It is, and it is not possible for it not to be” (Fr:2).
The second path of truth is more poignant here: “that it is not, and that it is bound not
to be: this I tell you (my emphasis) is a path that cannot be explored; for you could neither
recognise that which is not, nor express it.” (Fr:2) Let me just speculate for a moment here:
first, that this path is one of truth-full-ness, and moreover, a path denied to you the human
9

All quoted fragments, referenced as (Fr:) in the body of the text are from: Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the
Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Freeman, 1996)

being as understanding being, i.e. is an ontological statement about Dasein. The first, then,
indicates that ‘that which is not’ is truth in some fashion, the second that ‘that which is not’ is
a way of truth beyond (otherwise than) human Dasein (understanding). Is this second path
then, the truth of the divine, while the first is the truth of being-Dasein? This speculative
question makes sense of a line of fragment 8: “nor shall the force of credibility ever admit
that anything should come into being, besides being-itself, out of not-being” (the arche of
being).
This second path of truth in Parmenides is closely related to the question of arche in
pre-Socratic thinking (and Greek philosophy in general) as an intrinsically religious and
ethical question that is also (I would argue) ontological – that is: the question of originary
ground, the ground of being that is not-being. I cannot do justice to this problem here, but it
does suggest a major limitation in Heidegger’s thinking insofar as the religiosity of the
question also clears a space in which the prioritisation of Dasein may also be questioned and
disclosed in its limits.
If we acknowledge that the phenomenon of religion belongs-to and expresses the
being of humans then it is apparent that the concepts of Dasein and authenticity in
Heidegger’s philosophy are both problematic. The phenomenon of religion reveals something
about being human that exceeds the limits of Dasein, namely: our capacity to be in relation to
the truth as otherwise than being via the questions of the possibility of good and
meaning\purpose. Thus, the ontological question posed by religion would be: ‘who are we in
our being, that the otherwise than being is an issue for us?’
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